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Abstract Performance measures of individual scholars tend to ignore the context. I
introduce contextualised metrics: cardinal and ordinal pseudo-Shapley values that measure
a scholar’s contribution to (perhaps power over) her own school and her market value to
other schools should she change job. I illustrate the proposed measures with business
scholars and business schools in Ireland. Although conceptually superior, the power
indicators imply a ranking of scholars within a school that is identical to the corresponding
conventional performance measures. The market value indicators imply an identical
ranking within schools and a very similar ranking between schools. The ordinal indices
further contextualise performance measures and thus deviate further from the corre-
sponding conventional indicators. As the ordinal measures are discontinuous by con-
struction, a natural classiﬁcation of scholars emerges. Averaged over schools, the market
values offer little extra information over the corresponding production and impact mea-
sures. The ordinal power measure indicates the robustness or fragility of an institution’s
place in the rank order. It is only weakly correlated with the concentration of publications
and citations.
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Measuring the academic quality of schools and scholars is now routine practice. Scholars
are ranked according to their output or citations to their work, typically with some cor-
rection for quality. The ranking apart, scholars are evaluated without context, with in
reality scholars are afﬁliated to schools and part of communities. Schools are ranked
according to some aggregation of the scores of their members (Kalaitzidakis et al. 2003;
Nederhof 2008; Nederhof and Noyons 1992; Zhu et al. 1991).
1 However, some institutions
are carried by a single, exceptional individual, while other institutions have a large number
of good researchers (Crewe 1988). This has implications for the power relations within an
institution and for the robustness of its ranking to job mobility. The contextualised per-
formance indicators for individual scholars proposed in this article, when aggregated to
schools, measure fragility and robustness of the performance of schools. The proposed
indices thus complement standard measures of academic quality.
The proposed measures are variations of standard ones in economics. The starting point
is the Shapley value (Shapley 1953), which measures the average contribution of an agent
to any coalition. Instead of any coalition, I use the existing schools. Value is measured
cardinally (i.e., the score of the school) and ordinally (i.e., the rank of the school). As far as
I know, I am the ﬁrst to propose this.
2
I use the normalised Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure concentration
(Herﬁndahl 1951; Hirschman 1964).
3 While not new (Cox and Chung 1991; Rubin and
Chang 2003), this is not common in the scientometric literature.
4
While the new indicators constitute the main contribution of this article, the application
is interesting too. I illustrate the new measures using data on business schools and business
scholars in Ireland. Business research is rarely evaluated, at least in the academic literature
(Harzing 2005; Hodder and Hodder 2010; Hogan 1990; Kao and Pao 2009; Vieira and
Teixeira 2010).
This article continues as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the indicators and presents the
data. Section 3 applies this to business schools and business scholars in Ireland and dis-
cusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
Methods and data
Methods
Let us consider the number of publications P as an indicator for the production of a scholar,
and the number of citations C as an indicator for the quality or impact of the research.
These are standard indicators, but they are devoid of any context: the performance of a
scholar depends only on her own publications and citations.
5 When individual researchers
1 Of course, university departments have wider responsibilities than research (Coronini and Mangematin
1999).
2 A search on Shapley in abstracts of papers published in Scientometrics returns nothing.
3 See Lee (2010) for a discussion of alternative concentration measures.
4 A search on HHI in abstracts of papers published in Scientometrics returned one paper on research
performance (Yang et al. 2010).
5 de Witte and Rogge (2010) introduce a metric for publication efﬁciency which combines individual and
environmental characteristics.
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123are ranked according to these indicators, a context emerges—but individuals are treated as
independent of one another. In reality, however, scholars group together in schools.
Shapley (1953) introduced a measure for the contribution of an agent (scholar) to a
coalition (school). The Shapley value of an agent equals the average contribution of that
agent to any coalition. I here deﬁne the value of a coalition as the average number of
publications or citations. The contribution of a researcher is then the change in the coa-
lition’s value should this researcher leave or join the coalition. I only consider existing
institutions, rather than any coalition, and therefore refer to this indicator as a pseudo-
Shapley value. Following the convention in the analysis of cartels (d’Aspremont et al.
1983), I further assume that scholars make decisions independently of other scholars about
whether to change afﬁliation or retire.
The pseudo-Shapley value S for the number of publications pr of a researcher r in
institution 1 is deﬁned as:
Sr :¼
1
I
  p1  
n1
n1   1
  p1  
pr
n1   1
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contribution to other schools
ð1Þ
where ni is the number of members of institution i, I is the number of institutions, and   pi is
the average number of publications per researcher at institution i.
6 Institutions can be
ordered at will so that (1) deﬁnes Sr for researcher in any school. The pseudo-Shapley value
Sr is the contribution of an individual scholar to the research performance of a school,
averaged over all schools. It is increasing in the number of publications, and decreasing in
the number of scholars.
(1) splits the pseudo-Shapley value into two components. The ﬁrst component is the
actual indicator value for the school minus the indicator value in case scholar r departs.
7
The second component is the indicator value in case scholar r joins another school minus
the actual indicator value, averaged for the other schools.
Note that, in both components, we use the indicator with the scholar minus the indicator
without the scholar. Therefore, the pseudo-Shapley value is independent of the current
afﬁliation of the researcher.
The two components are more insightful than the pseudo-Shapley value itself. The ﬁrst
component is a measure of the power of an individual scholar over her school. The second
component is a measure of the contribution a scholar would make to the competition, that
is, a measure of the market value.
Let us therefore deﬁne two new indicators, power P and market value M, as follows:
Pr :¼
1
I
pr     p1
n1   1
ð2Þ
Mr :¼
1
I
X I
i¼2
pr     pi
ni þ 1
ð3Þ
6 (1) follows from the recursive property of averages:
  x ¼ 1
n
P n
i¼1
xi ¼ x1
n þ 1
n
P n
i¼2
xi ¼ x1
n þ n 1
n
1
n 1
P n
i¼2
xi ¼ x1
n þ n 1
n   xf1g:
7 Note that in the deﬁnition of the Shapley value actors are not evaluated relative to an existing coalition
structure. This is another reason why the proposed measure is a pseudo-Shapley value.
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123Note that Pr ? Mr = Sr.( 2) equals the ﬁrst component of (1), and (3) its second com-
ponent; in both cases, the equations were simpliﬁed. (1–3) are deﬁned for publication
numbers, but the same deﬁnitions hold for citation numbers, or quality-weighted publi-
cation numbers, or indeed any individual performance indicator that would be averaged to
assess the school performance.
In (1–3), the contribution of a scholar is deﬁned as her contribution to an indicator score
of a school. One may also consider the contribution of a researcher to the rank of any
existing institution.
8 This could be referred to as an ordinal pseudo-Shapley value
9 and it is
split into an ordinal power indicator and an ordinal market indicator.
In fact, the ordinal power and market indicators contain more information than the
ordinal Shapley values. The ordinal Shapley value measures the change in rankings should
a scholar leave a school to join another. This would push one school up in the rankings, and
another one down—while the ranking of third schools may be affected too. Indeed, the net
change in rankings of all schools is zero.
In the application below, for individual scholars, I report the number of publications, the
number of citations, the cardinal power and market indicators (based on both publications
and citations), and the ordinal power and market indicators (based on both publications and
citations).
For schools, I report the average number of publication and citations, and the average
cardinal and ordinal power and market indicators. Note that the average cardinal power
indicators are included for completeness only. The cardinal power index is an individual’s
contribution to the average. Its average is zero. A high value of the average ordinal power
measure indicates that a few scholars contribute most of the publications or citations of a
school—because individual scholars would have low power over their school if all their
colleagues perform equally well.
I compare the school’s power indicator to the HHI, which is a standard measure for the
concentration of market share. The HHI is deﬁned as the sum of the squared shares:
HHI ¼
X n
i¼1
pi
p
   2
; p ¼
X n
i¼1
pi ð4Þ
where pi is the number of publications (say) and n is the number of scholars (including the
ones that did not publish). The HHI lies between 1/n and one. The HHI would be one if a
single scholar authored all publications of a school (monopoly). The HHI would be 1/n if
all scholars in a school published the same number of papers. Because institutions differ in
size, I use the normalized HHI:
HHI  ¼
HHI   HHImin
1   HHImin
; HHImin ¼
X n
i¼1
1
n
   2
¼
1
n
ð5Þ
HHI* lies between zero and one, regardless of n.
ThereisnoreasontoassumethattheHHIandthepowerindicatorwillyieldsimilarresults.
The HHI is quadratic in a scholar’s number of publications and inversely proportional to the
square of the school’s publications. The power indicator also increases with a scholar’s
publications and decreases with her school’s number, but the relationships are linear.
8 This is intuitively clear, but notationally messy. I therefore skip the formalization. The computations are
illustrated in the ‘‘Appendix’’ section.
9 I therefore refer to the indicators S, P, and M as cardinal pseudo-Shapley values.
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123Data
I illustrate the above indicators with business scholars and business schools on the island of
Ireland. Business schools are hard to deﬁne. Some universities have an entity called
‘‘school of business’’, but other institutions mix business studies with other disciplines, or
spread business studies over a number of schools. Table 1 shows, for each of the 11
institutions,
10 the schools (colleges, faculties) and their departments (schools, groups).
There are two contentious issues. First, it is difﬁcult to draw a line between business
studies and economics. The topics are closely connected and often taught together. This
study includes those economists who teach in business schools, but excludes other econ-
omists. The other issue is tourism. In two institutions, tourist studies are part of the
business school, while elsewhere tourist studies are placed in other departments or indeed
in a separate department. Here, tourism scholars are included if they teach in a business
school.
For this study, business scholars are scholars who are employed in the business schools
as deﬁned in Table 1. People were identiﬁed as listed on the websites in early September
2010. There is no reason to believe that these lists are accurate. Indeed, several errors were
uncovered (and corrected) during the data vetting process (see below). However, it is the
only source of information available.
There are a total of 748 business scholars in Ireland. In addition, business schools
employ administrative staff, teaching and research assistants, and PhD students—all of
whom were excluded (if so identiﬁed). Business schools also have a large number of
adjunct faculty—typically, senior business people who teach a few classes a year—while
some business schools also host research staff from companies. These people were
excluded too.
748 is a substantial number of scholars, each of which has to be assessed individually.
11
For that reason, a simple method is used. Data were collected from Scopus
12 only. Scopus
has a much broader coverage than the Web of Science
13 for recent years (but a limited
coverage before 1996). As Irish business scholars tend to be relatively young and tend to
publish outside the core journals, Scopus is a more appropriate source of data. See also
(Vieira and Gomes 2009). Nonetheless, some journals are not covered in Scopus, including
a number of particular importance to business scholars in Ireland (e.g., Administration,
Irish Journal of Management, Irish Marketing Journal, Irish Marketing Review). Google
Scholar
14 (and thus Publish and Perish (Harzing 2010)
15 and Scholarometer
16) has a wider
coverage than Scopus and would thus be more appropriate for business scholars (Mingers
and Lipitakis 2010). However, Google Scholar suffers from a lack of quality control on
publications and citations.
17
10 There are also a number of business schools that only teach. These are excluded from the current study.
11 Note that the database contains another 124 individuals who were erroneously included.
12 http://www.scopus.com/home.url.
13 http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/.
14 http://scholar.google.com/.
15 http://www.harzing.com/pop.htm.
16 http://scholarometer.indiana.edu/.
17 For instance, Publish and Perish returns over 500 papers for the current author, whose CV counts less
than 200 publications.
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123Four statistics were gathered from Scopus: year of ﬁrst publication, number of publi-
cations, number of citations, and h-index (Hirsch 2005). People’s name, afﬁliation, spe-
cialization, degree, rank, and sex were also recorded. Here, I only use publications,
citations, and afﬁliations.
Table 1 Business schools assessed in this study
Acronym Institution School and department
DCU Dublin City University Business School
• Accounting
• Economics, ﬁnance and entrepreneurship
• Human resources management
• Management
• marketing
DIT Dublin Institute of Technology College of Business
• Accounting and ﬁnance
• Management
• Marketing
• Retail and services management
NCI National College of Ireland School of Business
NUIG National University of Ireland at Galway School of Business and Economics
• Economics
• Accountancy, ﬁnance and information systems
• Management
• Marketing
NUIM National University of Ireland at Maynooth School of Business
• Management
School of Economics, Finance and Accounting
QUB Queen’s University Belfast Management School
TCD Trinity College Dublin School of Business
UCC University College Cork Faculty of Commerce
• Accounting and ﬁnance
• Business information systems
• Food business and development
• Management and marketing
UCD University College Dublin School of Business
• Accountancy
• Management information systems
• Industrial relations and human resources
• Marketing
• Management
• Banking and ﬁnance
• Corporate governance
UL University of Limerick Business School
• Accounting and ﬁnance
• Economics
• Management and marketing
• Personnel and employment relations
UU University of Ulster Business School
• Accounting
• Business, retail and ﬁnancial services
• Hospitality and tourism management
• International business
• Management
• Marketing, entrepreneurship and strategy
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123The data are available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15802.
The data have been cross-checked with CVs when online. Three preliminary versions of
the data were published at IrishEconomy,
18 with an explicit invitation to correct data where
needed. Heads of departments were all notiﬁed of the exercise and invited to comment.
This vetting process led to substantial changes in the data—people and indeed departments
were added; administrative, adjunct and trainee staff were removed; and publication and
citation records were corrected.
The actual performance of business schools and scholars is discussed in detail in a
companion paper (Tol 2010). I here focus on the information contained in the new
indicators.
Results
Scholars
(2) has that the power indicator is linear in the number of publications or citations, with the
slope equal to the inverse of the number of schools times the number of scholars in a
school. The negative intercept equals the average number of publications or citations in the
school, divided by the number of scholars in the school (-1) and by the number of schools.
That is, both the intercept and the slope are different between schools but identical within
schools. Because of this, the power ranking within schools is the same as the publication/
citation ranking within schools.
Figure 1 shows the cardinal power indicators for the 748 business scholars in Ireland,
plotted against the number of publications and citations. Power over the own school
increases with production and inﬂuence, but the rate differs between schools. TCD is the
smallest school and has therefore the steepest incline. UU and DIT are the largest schools,
and the slope is thus the shallowest. Very productive or inﬂuential TCD scholars therefore
have a greater power than equally productive or inﬂuential UU scholars.
Figure 2 shows the ordinal power indices. The pattern is very different from that in
Fig. 1. Rank changes are integer, so average rank changes are discontinuous. Like the
cardinal power indicators, the ordinal power indicators increase in the number of publi-
cations and citations. However, the context is much more important. While some TCD
scholars have a great impact on the score of their small school, TCD is so far ahead of the
other business schools that only one scholar could, by departing affect its ranking on
publications—and none could affect TCD’s ranking on citations. DCU’s performance, on
the other hand, is similar to some of its competitors and a number of DCU scholars could
affect its ranking by departure.
(3) has that market value is linear in the number of publications or citations. The
intercept depends on the average number of publications or citations in all schools but
one’s own and on the number of scholars in those schools. The slope depends on the
number of scholars in other schools. One would therefore expect that all scholars are on
roughly the same line. Figure 3 conﬁrms this: Market value rise linearly with the number
of either publications or citations, and there is little difference between schools. The slope
varies between 0.0165 for TCD (the smallest school) and 0.0202 for DIT (the largest
18 http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2010/10/18/assessing-business-schools-and-business-scholars/,
http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2010/10/18/assessing-business-schools-and-business-scholars/,
http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/2010/11/01/business-schools-and-scholars-3/.
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Fig. 1 Cardinal power indicators for publications (top panel) and citations (bottom panel) as a function of
the number of publications and citations, respectively
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123school). This is intuitive: scholars from larger schools have fewer outside opportunities and
thus a greater impact. Differences are small, however.
Figure 4 shows the ordinal market value indicators. The indicator is discontinuous.
Market value increases with the number of publications and citations. However, scholars
from some schools need to publish more/be cited more to command the same market value
as do scholars of other schools. If a scholar moves from one school to another, the impact
on the ranking depends on her productivity/inﬂuence, the initial score and size of either
school and their position relative to other schools. With so many variables, the pattern is
highly non-linear and hard to interpret and predict.
Consider, for instance, the four scholars (one at NUIG, two at QUB, and one at UU) with
an ordinal market value based on publications of 0.64. Their publication numbers range
from 31 to 49. The discretisation of the ranking groups them together for a single market
value. There is another QUB scholar with an ordinal market value of 0.73 and 46 publi-
cations. He scores better than his QUB fellows with 35 and 37 papers. He also scores better
than the UU scholar with 49 publications. The reason is that ranks change if the QUB
scholar moves to UU; but not if the UU scholar moves to QUB. The market value indicator
captures part of the context in a way that simple publication or citation numbers cannot.
Schools
Table 2 shows the performance indicators for the 11 business schools in Ireland. The
smallest school employs only 20 scholars, the largest 147. Average publication numbers
range from 0.2 to 10.9 published papers per scholar, and average citations from 0.7 to 63.3
citations per scholar.
The average cardinal power indicator is zero by deﬁnition. The average ordinal power
indicator ranges from -2.28 to ?2.22 for publications and from -4.81 to 0.07 for cita-
tions. A negative value indicates that the school’s rank would improve if the average
scholar departs. A positive value indicates that the departure of a scholar would lead, on
average, to a lower rank—a scholar could use this threat to exert power. There are also
schools with an average power index of zero—that is, the departure of the scholar would
not on average affect the ranking. Zero values are more prevalent near the top and bottom
of the publication and citation ranks, because ranks can change in one direction only.
Table 2 also shows the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Indices which range from 0.03 to 0.24
for publications and from 0.05 to 0.90 for citations. Citations are more concentrated than
publications, except for UCD.
Figure 5 plots the concentration indices against the power indices. Although there is a
suggestion of some relationship—greater concentration and greater power seem to go
together—the two indicators clearly measure different things. NCI, for instance, has an
extremely high concentration of citations. However, as NCI is ranked last on citations,
highly-cited researchers at NCI cannot exert any inﬂuence over NCI’s rank. Publications
are less concentrated at NCI, but as NCI is ranked 10th, the (threatened) departure of a
highly productive scholar would (potentially) affect NCI’s publication rank. Thus, while
the HHI measures concentration, the power index contextualizes this and measures whe-
ther exceptional scholars can exert inﬂuence.
DCU scores highest on the ordinal power indicator for publications. The departure of
either of its top two scholars would see DCU drop 1.8 places on average (from 7th to 9th in
most cases, and from 7th to 8th in some). There are another ten scholars whose departure
would cause DCU’s publication rank to fall. However, the departure of none of the other
51 scholars would cause a change in rank. The large size of the department also means that
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123HHI is relative small: although a few individuals stand out for the number of publications,
their share is in the total output of the department is nonetheless small.
UCC scores lowest on the ordinal power indicator for publications. It would rise in the
rankings if one of its 25 worst performers would leave, but the departure of only its 5 best
performers would lead to a drop in ranking. NUIM scores lowest on the ordinal power
indicator for citations. A departure by any of its 18 worst performer would improve its
rankings, while the departure of only two would lead to a drop in rank.
The ordinal power indicator thus identiﬁes schools with potential problems. In one
school, two scholars can sway the rankings; in two other schools, a ranking-conscious head
of department may ask certain people to leave.
Table 2 further shows the average market value indicators, both cardinal and ordinal.
Figure 6 plots the market value indices against the number of publications and citations.
Cardinal market value is linear in the number. This is true for the individual scores (cf.
Fig. 3), and therefore also for the average scores. Ordinal market value tends to increase
with the number, but a richer pattern emerges because ordinal values take context into
account. Figure 4 shows that there is a different association between publications/citations
and market value for scholars at different schools. Figure 6 conﬁrms this.
Discussion and conclusion
Current performance measures of individual scholars ignore the context of scholarship. I
introduce pseudo-Shapley values that measure a scholar’s contribution to (or power over)
her own school and her value to other schools should they hire her. I illustrate the proposed
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123measures with business scholars and business schools in Ireland. Although conceptually
superior, the power indicators lead to an identical ranking of scholars within a school as
conventional performance measures would, while the market value indicators lead to an
identical ranking within schools and a very similar ranking between schools. I introduce
both cardinal and ordinal indicators. The ordinal indices further contextualise performance
measures and thus deviate more from conventional indicators. Furthermore, as the ordinal
measures are discontinuous by construction, a natural classiﬁcation of scholars emerges.
Averaged over schools, the ordinal and particularly the cardinal market values offer little
extra information over the average publication and citation numbers. The ordinal power
measure gives, for the ﬁrst time, an indication of the robustness or fragility of an insti-
tution’s place in the rank order. It is only weakly correlated with the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman
concentration index of publications and citations.
The proposed measures open up new avenues for research. Do scholars prefer to work in
schools in which they are powerful, or would they rather work in a place where their
average colleague outperforms them (so that they maximise learning)? This cannot be
answered with a cross-section (as used in this article); panel data are required to separate
cause and effect. Is the ranking of fragile schools (according to the measures proposed
here) indeed more volatile? This would again require data for multiple years.
The measures themselves can be further reﬁned too. Particularly, I used publications and
citations numbers for scholars, and their averages for schools. The mathematics is therefore
rather straightforward. The power and market value indicators could be deﬁned from more
complex performance measures too, such as the h-index (Hirsch 2005). Furthermore, I
assume that scholars are individuals, and negotiate as such with their schools. It is not
uncommon, however, for a team of scholars to move from one school to another. Pseudo-
Shapley values naturally generalise to this case—indeed, the actual Shapley value is deﬁned
for any coalition—but this was not considered here. All this is deferred to future research.
Acknowledgments I am grateful to all who helped to improve the database by checking their entries. I had
useful discussions on this subject with Frances Ruane. An anonymous referee had excellent comments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: A worked example
Table 3 illustrates the computation of the cardinal and ordinal power and market indices.
The columns to the left consider School A. Initially, there are three researchers in School
A, two average ones and one outstanding. School A has a higher average score than
Schools B and C, and ranks ﬁrst. This is shown in the top rows of Table 3.
The second set of rows shows what would happen to the schools’ scores if the out-
standing scholar moves to School B, and the third set of rows if she were to leave for
School C. In both cases, the score of School A would drop from 40 to 10, for an average of
30. 30 is therefore the cardinal measure of power of the outstanding scholar over her
original school A. A move would increase the score of 11.21 and 11.29 for School B and C,
respectively, for an average of 11.25. This is the cardinal measure of market value.
If the outstanding scholar leaves for School B, School A falls from ﬁrst to second place,
and if she moves to School C, School A falls to third place. The average drop is 1.5 places,
and this is the ordinal measure of power.
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123School B would rise to ﬁrst place in one case and stay in second in the other. School C
would rise to ﬁrst place in one case and stay third in the other. The average (over cases and
schools) rank chance is 0.75. This is ordinal measure of market value.
The right columns of Table 3 repeat the same computations, but now for an average
scholar initially in School B. The cardinal indicators are relatively small, and the ordinal
ones are zero. This is as one would expect. A scholar who is close to average of the own
school and all schools would not exert much inﬂuences over rankings.
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